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The Conundrum of the Curtilage: A Critical
Interpretation of Florida v. Jardines
Justin Shaw1, T. Mark Frost2, and Michael Stevens3

I

n late November of 2006, the Miami police received an unverified tip regarding a man who was surreptitiously producing illegal narcotics in his home.4 Two officers from the local drug-unit
were dispatched along with a drug detection dog. Upon arrival, they
surveyed the house for a few minutes and found closed blinds, an
empty driveway, and no observable activity. Recognizing this, one
detective took the leashed dog and casually walked to the front door;
whereupon, the dog confirmed the presence of narcotics on the property. With this indication, the detectives left the premises and obtained a search warrant. After searching the home, they confirmed
the existence of prohibited substances.
When the case went to trial, the accused demanded that the evidence (the drugs) be suppressed on the grounds that it was obtained
in an unlawful manner constituting an “unlawful search or seizure.”
The defendant argued that the search was “unlawful” because the
police officers invaded an area of private property to gain the necessary information for a warrant. The case eventually reached the
Supreme Court wherein the justices hotly debated the question as to
whether this instance constituted a Fourth Amendment search. The
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justices argued that the use of the dog in the acquisition of evidence
and the porch and its inclusion in the protections afforded to a home
qualified as a Fourth Amendment search. In a five-four decision, the
Justices decided that the porch was incorporated into the curtilage;
thereby, validating the defendant’s claims. The narcotics were suppressed as evidence because the policemen’s search was considered
unconstitutional in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.
The facts of this case come from the Supreme Court Case, Florida v. Jardines. The dilemma examined in the case questions the
boundary between government intrusion and government protection. By ruling that the porch is included in the curtilage, the laws regarding the surrounding area of one’s home have become even more
ambiguous. This ambiguity results from a porch’s lack of privacy,
generally available to areas inside the home and the enclosures of a
curtilage. The decision jeopardizes the rights of citizens by causing
uncertainty in knowing property boundaries. The ambiguity is also
problematic for law enforcement officers who desire to protect the
community, but are unsure where the partition of citizen protection
begins and ends.5
While the Supreme Court already ruled on the issue, setting a
precedent for future cases, this paper offers an alternative solution
wherein the porch operates in its own unique legal position. This
unique position in the law is more consistent with past legal precedent and reconciles both the majority opinion and dissenting opinion
of the Supreme Court.
This article shall examine the definition of curtilage throughout
American legal history, including various cases that have extended
the definition of the curtilage, as well as cases that have used past
precedents in determining whether a specific instance qualifies as a
curtilage or not. Part I shall examine the history of the curtilage. Part
II will identify the failure of consideration by the majority opinion
in distinguishing the porch’s “publicness.” Part III shall analyze the
decision in Florida v. Jardines and establish how it is inconsistent
5
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with past precedent. Part IV will seek to clarify and expand on the
dissenting opinion to describe a better interpretation of the definition
of the curtilage. Based upon these opinions, Part V proposes that the
walkway and porch of a home operate in their own sphere, carving
out what would then be its own unique position in legal procedure.

I. Background
(i) The Progressive Definition of Curtilage
The curtilage has progressed to become an integral part of the
law, protecting outlying parts of a person’s property that are entitled
to the protections given to the home. Laws regarding searches and
seizures in the United States developed from clauses in the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment was principally created to
inhibit government searches and seizures of one’s dwelling. The
amendment was drafted due to continual abuses of the writs of assistance, an unlimited search warrant enacted by the British government which allowed searches without necessary cause to look for
evidence of smuggling.6 Derived from common law, the term curtilage was defined in 1891 in Black’s Law Dictionary as,
The enclosed space of ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwelling-house. In its most comprehensive and proper
legal signification, it includes all that space of ground and buildings thereon which is usually enclosed within the general fence immediately surrounding a principal messuage [sic] and outbuildings,
and yard closely adjoining to a dwelling-house, but it may be large
enough for cattle to be levant [sic] and couchant therein.7
This definition since determined what qualifies as curtilage and
what does not. It has assisted in granting protections to certain areas
of the home that would otherwise be unprotected. Nevertheless, this
developing definition still retains a large level of ambiguity. Even in
established definitions, certain words can be explained in a variety
6
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of ways. The Court has, therefore, been operating on a case-by-case
basis.
(ii) United States v. Dunn
In the Supreme Court Case, United States v. Dunn, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers learned that a certain carpenter had been buying large quantities of chemicals typically used
in the manufacture of controlled substances.8 The officers placed
tracking “beepers” within some of the equipment containers. These
beepers led the officers to the carpenter’s ranch. Through the use
of aerial photography, the DEA learned that the suspect’s truck had
been parked at a barn behind the ranch house. The entire ranch was
enclosed by a fence and contained several smaller barbed wire fences.
Without a warrant, officers traversed the border fence, barbed
wire fences, and wooden fence to reach the barn. As they approached,
they could smell pungent chemicals plausibly issuing from the barn.
Also, while they approached, they could hear the faint workings of
a small motor, supposedly coming from inside the barn. While the
officers did not enter the barn, they halted at a locked gate, shined a
flashlight inside, and observed what appeared to be a drug laboratory. Having gained the evidence they needed, they left. The DEA
officers returned twice the following day to vindicate the presence of
the laboratory. The officers obtained a warrant, arrested the carpenter, and seized the chemicals.9
The suspect argued that the evidence be suppressed on the basis
that it was obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure. The
Court of Appeals suppressed the evidence stating that the barn was
within the resident’s curtilage, and that it carried a reasonable expectation of privacy. When the case went before the Supreme Court,
the justices overturned the Court of Appeals decision and held that
all the evidence was admissible. This landmark case significantly
contributed to the definition of the curtilage because The Court was
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able to specifically dictate the stipulations of what does and does not
qualify as a curtilage. The court stated,
[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to
be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within
an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses
to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident
to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a
finely tuned formula that . . . yields a “correct” answer to all
extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree . . . they bear upon the
centrally relevant consideration — whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be
placed under the home’s “umbrella” of Fourth Amendment
protection. Applying these factors to respondent’s barn and
to the area immediately surrounding it, we have little difficulty in concluding that this area lay outside the curtilage
of the ranch house.10
This decision contributed immensely to the definition of the curtilage. The Court identified four independent factors (proximity of the
area, if the area is in an enclosure, the nature of its uses, and steps
taken to protect the area) that should help in determining whether a
specific area qualifies as curtilage. Each factor must be separately
considered if a reasonable conclusion is to be made.
(iii) California v. Ciraolo
The Supreme Court Case, California v. Ciraolo, made another
significant addition to the understanding of the curtilage.11 Dante
Carlo Ciraolo had been growing marijuana in his backyard; high
fences concealed the cannabis’s visibility. Upon receiving an anonymous tip, the Santa Clara Police Department dispatched detectives
10
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in a private plane to discover if there was any basis to the claim. The
policemen flew over the house at an altitude of 1,000 feet and took
photos of Ciraolo’s backyard for investigation. The officers were able
to observe, without any visual enhancements, the existence of the
marijuana. The officers obtained a warrant based upon this observation alone.
Similar to the Florida v. Jardines case, the defendant requested
that the evidence be suppressed based upon the manner that the evidence was obtained. Ciraolo argued that obtaining evidence through
an aerial search qualified as an unreasonable search, therefore violating the exclusionary rule.12 The exclusionary rule states any evidence collected in a way that violates a citizen’s rights is prohibited.
The question then was if evidence obtained by the naked eye, in an
arguably public place constituted an unlawful search. The case also
analyzed whether the backyard should be included in the protections
of the curtilage.
The Supreme Court allowed the evidence to stand. Chief Justice
Warren Burger wrote in the majority opinion, “The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is
visible to the naked eye.”13 The logic for this conclusion takes into
consideration the “publicness” of the space in question. The police
officers could not be held to the impractical stricture of ignoring
what they see while investigating an air space or public area. This
question of “publicness” is an important distinction to understanding an area legally.
In the case, Florida v. Jardines, the essential question is whether
or not the porch should qualify as being part of the curtilage being a
“public” or visible area. The dispute in the case arises from the act
of the detectives walking along the pathway to the house and stopping while on the front porch. Detective Douglas Bartelt approached
the house with his trained narcotics dog. Bartelt later noted that the
dog had responded to the smell of drugs while on the driveway before even reaching the porch of the house. The dog began tracking
12
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as it is trained to do, then centered on the strongest location of the
odor. The dog began to “bracket,” or as detective Bartelt described,
the dog began “tracking that airborne odor by…tracking back and
forth,”.14 Finally, the dog concluded its search at what happened to
be the base of the front door. With the discovery, the dog sat down
indicating that it had discovered the scent’s most powerful point.
With this information, one detective left, having obtained the information required for a warrant. The other detective stayed put on the
driveway. While there, he could hear the air conditioner running and
could smell the traces of marijuana.15 Later, police arrested Joelis
Jardines after he attempted to flee from police. Upon examination
of the home, the investigators confirmed that cannabis plants were
being cultivated there.
When the case went to trial, Jardines requested that the evidence
obtained (the cannabis) be suppressed due to the unreasonableness
of the drug-sniffing dog’s use in obtaining evidence. The arguments
focused largely on the question of “[w]hether the officers’ conduct
during the investigation of the grow house, including remaining outside the house awaiting a search warrant is, itself, a Fourth Amendment search”.16 The exploration of this and other questions was the
basis for the opinions of the court.

II. Failure of Consideration in “Publicness”
(i) Failure of the Majority Opinion
The court failed to consider the “publicness”17 of the porch when
deliberating over Florida v. Jardines. As the arguments were heard
14
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for both sides, it was decided by a 5-4 majority that the porch is included in the curtilage, and the evidence condemning Joelis Jardines
should be tossed out. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for
the case. The foundation of Justice Scalia’s opinion rests upon the
notion that the curtilage is established as a protected area against
unreasonable searches and seizures. This point has been thoroughly
attested through numerous cases relating to the subject as previously
presented. In Justice Scalia’s estimation, the curtilage bears similarity to the inside of the house, receiving many of the same rights and
protections.
Nevertheless, the curtilage differs acutely from the interior of
one’s home. This fact is not articulated in the majority’s opinion. The
porch of one’s home is placed under this protective umbrella without
the consideration of its unique position as a public area (meaning visible to onlookers). Much of what can be lawfully performed within
the confines of a person’s home would otherwise be illegal if engaged in on his or her porch. This distinction is vital in establishing
what activities are permissible on the porch and other public areas
on private property.
(ii) The Relative Expectation of Privacy
Because it is a public area, the porch surrenders many of the
rights guaranteed to the interior of the home. For instance, a person
is free to mill about nude within the enclosure of his or her home.
However, the same activity, when done in the plain sight of the porch,
becomes illegal. The differentiation between the two activities lies
in the publicity of the event. The terminology for this category of
unlawful conduct is “public indecency” or “indecent exposure.”18
This same practice can even be considered lawful when carried out
in the backyard. It is legal as long as it is beyond the visibility of
others. Why? Because the backyard is allowed a relative expectation

18
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of privacy.19 The porch is, thus, fundamentally different from other
areas of the curtilage.
The façade of one’s residence is tremendously public. It is generally understood that anything that a person may wish to remain
private should be removed from the front windows (within visible
sight) of the home. This “reasonable expectation of privacy” was
established in the Supreme Court case, Katz v. United States.20 In
the concurring opinion, Justice Harlan identified an objective prong
for searches dealing with the Fourth Amendment, namely, that the
space in question is reasonably recognized (objectively) by society
as a place that should receive privacy.
In dealing with questions regarding the curtilage, it is helpful to
consider the searches allowed by the Fourth Amendment and what
constitutes a “search.” The porch is certainly a location that is sufficiently public to surrender any “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
In the Jardines case, the officers did not look through any windows
to gain evidence. Rather, they were investigating in plain sight, an
area visible to the general public. Jardine’s closed blinds protected
the depths of his home. Justice Scalia ignores the fact that the porch
differs significantly from the interior of the home. These differences
manifest the neglect of the majority opinion.
The inconsideration of the “publicness” of the porch creates ambiguity for citizens. Suppose cannabis were being grown on the front
porch of a home and law enforcement officers received an anonymous tip detailing this fact. Would the officers need a warrant to
approach the front door to confirm the plant’s existence? Would the
officer need a warrant to survey this apparently public area? Having
the porch included in the protections of the curtilage, it treats the
area similarly to the inside of the home. Such ambiguous questions
are raised with the inclusion of the porch in the protections typically
granted to a home.

19
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III. Consistency With Past Precedent
(i) Consideration of Dunn Case in Jardines
A citizen’s home is protected under the Fourth Amendment.
This law should prevent unauthorized government intrusion. Likewise, property owners have other areas that deserve the safety of the
Fourth Amendment. For instance, one’s garage is a place that needs
to fall under the “umbrella” of the house.
As mentioned, the determination of such locations is typically
in a case by case basis. The disputed spot must qualify under some
of the stipulations dictated in the case, United States v. Dunn. One
of the qualifications established is the nature of the area’s use. The
majority in the Jardines case did not properly consider the “nature of
[the area’s] uses” with the porch.21 It is vital to recognize that some
areas of the curtilage differ from others. The Dunn case decided
that a private barn, protected by fences and other safe guards, was
determined to be outside of the home’s curtilage. It is peculiar that a
seemingly private barn, behind a home and barred by fences, gates,
and other exterior warnings, is not a part of the curtilage. In contrast,
the curtilage encompasses the front porch, a place where solicitors,
hawkers, and peddlers of all kinds are able to enter without the consent of the homeowner.
In United States v. Dunn, the Supreme Court established four
factors vital in determining the curtilage of a home. The second factor questions “whether the thing is within an enclosure surrounding
the home”.22 Unfortunately, an acknowledgment of this delimitation
is absent in Justice Scalia’s interpretation. Generally speaking, the
façade of a citizen’s home is not always enclosed. Does this mean
that only those who have enclosed their front yard or porch are protected? Such questions become evident after examining the majority
opinion. The uncertainty contributes to the ambiguity of the Court’s
decision.
21
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The opinion in Florida v. Jardines also fails to recognize the
precedent established in California v. Ciraolo in which a man was
growing marijuana in his backyard, shielded from view by large
fences. The court determined the warrantless observation of one’s
backyard was legal inasmuch as the location was “visible to the
naked eye.”23 Visibility played a significant role in the decision of the
court. How then is the porch, arguably more public than a backyard,
an area that is more protected? The narcotics in Florida v. Jardines
were made public by their scent given to the dog. The detectives
reported also that they could smell the marijuana drifting from the
house by the home’s air conditioner. The evidence was made public.
The five senses are not treated differently by the Fourth Amendment. No protections can be granted for information exposed to the
public. For instance, the sound of one’s voice, the style of one’s handwriting, the smell of illegal drugs, all when made public can be used
as evidence in the court of law.

IV. The Dissent and its Consideration of Trespass Laws
(i) The Fourth Amendment
An intrusion into the home/curtilage would qualify as a “search”
as dictated by the Fourth Amendment. The intrusion would also be
grounds for action against trespassing. However, there is another
distinction of trespass, which denotes “the act of knowingly entering
another person’s property without permission. Such action is held
to infringe upon a property owner’s legal right to enjoy the benefits
of ownership.”24 Such an act would violate the Fourth Amendment.
These rights, similar to the idea of the curtilage, are to protect people’s property from invasions of privacy. Nevertheless, law enforcement officials have in past instances, disregarded trespass laws to
obtain evidence lawfully.

23
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(ii) Oliver v. United States
In 1982, Kentucky State Police acquired reports that marijuana
was being grown on a farm within their county; the officers were dispatched to investigate. Upon arrival, officers drove to a locked gate
labeled with a “No Trespassing” sign. Alongside this locked gate,
however, was a small footpath. The agents walked along the footpath, around the gate, and discovered a field of marijuana. Initially,
the District Court suppressed the evidence and held that the petitioner had “a reasonable expectation that the field would remain private
and that it was not an ‘open’ field that invited casual intrusion.”25 The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision; the Supreme Court upheld
this reversal in Oliver v. United States.
In Oliver, the court held, “[A]n individual may not legitimately
demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home”.26 Certainly, the
court did not imply that any “priva[te] activity” may be conducted
“in the area immediately surrounding the home.” There are undoubtedly, as mentioned, certain activities that are prohibited in the area
surrounding the home.
Justice Alito wrote the dissenting opinion, in which he argued
that the decision to suppress the evidence on grounds that the evidence was obtained in an unlawful manner simply does not hold
because it does not follow prior Supreme Court jurisprudence. In
Justice Alito’s dissent, he states, “trespass law provides no support
for the Court’s holding.”27 Justice Alito further concludes that while
the curtilage is constitutionally protected, it is categorically different from other areas of the home in that Detective Bartelt and his
dog were on the paved sidewalk—the course any visitor would use
to approach the house. He was not sulking around in the bushes, nor
climbing on the roof.
When detective Bartelt approaches the door of a house, he is well
within his rights to do so. This right was established in Kentucky v.
25
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King where it was determined that a policeman may approach the
front door of a residence and it is not specifically categorized as a
“search”.28 Also, as Justice Alito cites in his dissent, “police officers
do not engage in a search when they approach the front door of a residence and seek to engage in what is termed a ‘knock and talk,’ i.e.,
knocking on the door and seeking to speak to an occupant for the
purpose of gathering evidence.”29 A detective is still able to approach
a front door because it is the typical entryway to the house. This
demonstrates the variance between a front door and the backyard. If
a cop were to be sneaking around the perimeter of the backyard, then
a resident would be justified in calling the police.
With this establishment, the matter in question becomes the
physical use of the dog. In both United States v. Place30 and Illinois
v. Caballes31, the Supreme Court established that a sniff by a police
dog, specially trained to detect the presence of narcotics is not a
“search” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It is considered “sui generis,” or a “special category,” which is intended only to
reveal the presence of narcotics.32 In United States v. Place, the canine was used to approximate the location of drugs concealed in luggage at an airport.33 Likewise, in Illinois v. Caballes, a drug-sniffing
dog was used in a routine traffic stop to locate contraband.34 Both
of these cases establish that the utilization of a drug-sniffing dog in
the locating and confiscation of narcotics is not inherently unlawful.

28
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V. Resolution: Porch as a Distinct Legal Location
The Jardines search did not involve an intrusion into intimate
or private areas of the home. The dog and the police officer merely
walked along the path to the home’s porch—a reasonably public area
from its traditional use. The dog was not rummaging through the papers of Joelis Jardines in the home’s interior. Any other citizen who
approached the door with a dog would have been well within their
constitutional rights to approach the front door of a home. In Jardines, the dog merely conveyed a public fact; it sat down at the front
door, indicating that drugs were present in the home. As mentioned,
one of the police officers remarked that he could smell the scent of
marijuana emanating from the home’s air conditioning unit. The
dog’s indication enabled the police officers to secure a warrant—the
necessary documentation to perform a search.
As a result of the deviation from past precedent and the failure
to consider the difference of the porch as a public space, the porch
needs to occupy a distinct position in legal understanding. The porch
deserves rights and privileges that are not afforded to a public space.
It needs to protect one’s home from invasion and misconduct. Nevertheless, the fact remains, the porch and the walkway leading to the
porch is a relatively public space. The porch is a paradox because
it is accessible to those who wish to engage with the homeowner,
but it is private in the sense that there are certain activities that are
restricted on the porch because it is another person’s property. This
paradox does not align with the definition of a curtilage. The porch
should not be as protected as a curtilage, because a curtilage implies
an inclosure or private space. The resolution between these two conflicting concepts is the porch needs to occupy a special space beyond
that of curtilage.
The porch, receiving its own special recognition in the law,
would relieve much of the ambiguity surrounding the porch and it’s
incorporation into the curtilage. This new distinction will operate
upon the principle of reasonable intent. Therefore, one is able to approach another person’s home (including the walkway to the porch
and the porch itself) with reasonable intent to somehow engage with
the homeowner. This difference will give a level of privacy to the
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homeowner who does not wish for misconduct on their porch, as
well as a level of accessibility to those who wish to approach the
home and engage with the homeowner. Under this idea, the evidence
in the case of Florida v. Jardines would not have been suppressed
because the police, acting upon a tip, had a reasonable intent to approach the home.
The new conception of the porch reconciles the two opinions
(both Scalia and Alito) of the court, and does not disregard prior
precedent regarding the matter. Thus, in future cases dealing with
the porch of one’s home, the courts would be able to analyze the
reasonable intent of the offender. We define porch as the area surrounding the front entrance of one’s home. When the front of a home
has two or more main entrances, each entrance shall be included
under the protections afforded to the porch. Also, in cases regarding
a home that sits upon land that is a great distance from a street, a
person may approach the home with the reasonable intent of somehow engaging with the homeowner. Obviously this proposal has its
shortcomings; nevertheless, it is an appropriate proposition to curtail
some of the problems that have occurred on the porch of a home.

